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Draft Recommendation
on WEU and Helios 2
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 523, 555, 567, 570
space-based observation system and the future of the WEU
and 516 on the development of a European
Satellite Centre,
(ii) Taking note of the Madrid Declaration resulting from the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
on 14 November 1995 and tasking the Space Group to define the conditions for WEU participation in a
" developing multilateral European programme and to study questions related to a possible WEU ground
segment, taking account of existing ground segments within WEU nations ".
(iii) Welcoming the agreement concluded between France and Germany in Baden-Baden in December
1995 concerning cooperation on two observation satellites, namely, Helios 2, a French infrared optical
satellite and Horus, a German radar satellite;
(iv) Applauding the fact that the abovementioned agreement
1995 of protocols for the creation by Aerospatiale and Dasa of
resulted in the signature on 15 December
two joint subsidiaries, European Satellite
Industries (ESI) and European Missile Systems (EMS)l
(v) Welcoming the participation of Italy and Spain in the Helios 2 and Horus programmes. which now
appears virtually certain;
(vi) Considering that civil and military programmes must not compete with but rather complement one
another and achieve synergy, as was the case in the Helios 1 programme;
(vii) Taking into account the fact that the distinctive feature of the Helios I programme consists in the
pa(icipating countries sharing the satellite's in-orbit operation and that this arrangement has been wholly
successful;
(vili) Considering that this proves it is possible to share an observation system for defence purposes;
(ix) Noting that WEU participation in the Helios 2 and Horus programmes is not only desirable and
necessary but is also feasiblel
(x) Deeming it essential to meet the deadlines set for each of the programmes;
(xi) Recognising that while this implies ruling out any industrial role for WEU in the Helios 2 pro-
gramme, its participation in the satellite's programming can be envisaged and that, in the case of the Horus
programme, it would be possible for it to take part not only in an industrial but also in a programming
capacity;
(xii) Aware that WEU's position must not be based on a mere aggregate of various national requirements
but on an overall strategic vision;
(xiii) Considering that it would be appropriate if WEU were to indicate to those countries which have
decided to participate in Helios 2 and Horus that it wishes to be involved in those programmes, and des-
cribe to them the arrangements for such participation, without necessarily having to wait for the said coun-
tries to make an offer;
(xit,) Considering that this approach requires firm political resolve on the part of the WEU countries;
Qr) Welcoming the decision conferring upon the WEU Satellite Centre the status of a permanent subsi-diary bodyl
(xt'i) Considering that the imminent arrival of the first Helios 1 products will mark the start of a new
phase for the Satellite Centre;
(xvii) Noting that any WEU commitments regarding Helios 2 and Horus together with an increase in the
o_perational capabilities of the Satellite Centre will require a series of measures to be taken in respect of the
Centre:
(xviii)Recalling the recommendations adopted by the Assembly on the need ro develop relations with the
European Space Agency in order to benefit from its experience and structures in so far as they could serveWEU's objectives;
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(xix) Regretting once again that, while the WEU Council has to observe the requisite discretion about
space activities, it does not provide the Assembly with more detailed and more specific information which
would help the Assembly obtain the necessary support of the general public.
REcol,ruENos rHAr rsE CouNcu-
1. Study arrangements for possible participation by WEU in the Helios 2 and Horus programmes,
taking account of the following:
(a) owing to the advanced stage of the Helios 2 programme. it is inconceivable for WEU to play an
industrial role in the programme;
(b) WEU participation in the programming of Helios 2 is both desirable and feasible;
(c) such participation in the satellite's programming must be based on WEU's strategic needs as an
organisation and not on a mere aggregate of various national requirements;
(d) it is still possible for WEU to participate in the Horus programme in both an industrial and a
programming capacity;
2. Present a proposal to the countries participating in the Helios 2 and Horus programmes without
necessarily waiting for them to specify their proposal to WEU;
3. Involve the Planning Cell and Intelligence Section in the WEU study and subsequent proposals and
make this an official arrangement so that in future the two bodies are perrnanently linked to the system's
operation;
4. Make the procedure concerning task requests to the Satellite Centre more flexible and simple with
a view to reducing the time it takes to complete;
5. Provide the Satellite Centre with its own receiving centre and a telecommunications link with
Brussels;
6. Equip the Satellite Centre with a mobile imaging station enabling it to acquire and analyse images
on the spot;
7 . Develop synergies between civil and military research projects using common technologies;
8. Study a combination of the airborne and satellite solutions for monitoring the earth;
9. Communicate to the Assembly more detailed and more specific information about WEU's space
activities which, while respecting the necessary confidentiality. enables the Assembly to associate the
public with its work;
10. Develop relations with the European Space Agency in order to benefit from its experience and
structures.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Lenzer, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
l. This report should be considered as the
logical sequel and consequence of the work done
by the Technological and Aerospace Committee,
which has organised a number of colloquies and
produced various reports over the last ten years in
particular, with a view to Europe acquiring an
autonomous space-based observation capability.
2. Some events that have taken place in recent
years in or outside Europe support the view that
the strategic need for a space-based observation
system is becoming an increasingly pressing
requirement.
3. On the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet
empire has put Europe in a new situation in which
the limited risks to its security have replaced the
major threat of the past. On the other, various fac-
tors making for instability on the southern shores
of the Mediterranean pose a danger for European
security.
4. Furthermore, as was stated in the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), European countries are
having to take on ever greater responsibilities
with a view not only to guaranteeing their imme-
diate security but also to increasing stability
throughout the world.
5. It is for this reason that the Petersberg
Declaration. the second part of which deals with
strengthening WEU's operational role. specifies
in accordance with the Declaration by the WEU
member states attached to the TEU. that " WEU
member states have been examining and defining
appropriate missions. structures and means cove-
ring. in particular, a WEU planning cell and mili-
tary units answerable to WEU, in order to streng-
then WEU's operational role ".
6. Thus. in addition to the provisions of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty in rela-
tion to a common defence, military units answer-
able to WEU can carry out the following tasks
acting under the authority of WEU:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks:
- 
peacekeeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis manage-
ment, including peace enforcement.
7. WEU's involvement in the Gulf war and
the conflict in former Yugoslavia very clearly
demonstrated the absolute necessity of obtaining
information from space-based observation sys-
tems and proved that the lack of an autonomous
space capability deprived European fbrces of the
independence that was indispensable. If Europe
had its own space-based observation facilities.
they would constitute a capital asset for the esta-
blishment of a credible and effective security and
defence system.
8. As well as monitoring crises that could
affect European security to a greater or lesser
degree. the purpose of a European space-based
observation system would also be to verify disar-
mament treaties, control arms proliferation and,
last but not least. monitor risks and threats to the
environment.
9. For the purpose of expressing an opinion
on this matter, the Committee has not only eva-
luated the political and military factors but has
also assessed European technological and indus-
trial capabilities and questions concerning the
cost, development and use of a space-based sys-
tem. In this context it has considered it important
to ensure that the public at large is associated with
the project from the outset.
10. Alongside other factors of equal impor-
tance, the financial aspect is the overriding consi-
deration when it comes to making a choice. The
cost of a European space-based observation sys-
tem is extremely high and that is why the Com-
mittee has stressed that it is essential to inform the
public in the various European countries of the
objective need for such a system and of the advan-
tages its development would have not only for
European security but also for international stabi-
lity. The Committee is firmly convinced that the
support of Europe's citizens is fundamental for
going ahead with the project.
11. In order to inform and convince the tax-
payers. the WEU Assembly and national parlia-
rnents have a considerable task to accomplish in
association with the government and the WEU
Council which, while observing the discretion
such matters usually require, should avoid excessive
secrecy as this would do nothing to help secure
the citizens' support that is essential.
12. The Committee is firmly convinced of this
need and has stressed the point on many occasions
in recent years'.
l. See Recommendatrons 555,567, 510 and576
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13. The last colloquy organised by the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee and entitled
" A European space-based observation system "
was held in March 1995 at San Agustin (Canary
Islands) and provided the political, military,
scientific and industrial communities with a
unique opportunity to study all the problems
posed by a project of this scope and discuss them.
After the colloquy. the Committee produced
Document 1454t and the relevant recommenda-
tion (576). It was adopted by the Assembly at its
June 1995 session and among other things invited
the Council to:
" seek agreement with the countries deci-
ding to participate in the Helios and Osiris
programmes for facilitating implementa-
tion of these programmes and associating
other member countries, integrating them
progressively into WEU's activities and. to
this end, requesting participating countries
to open up these programmes to their WEU
partners;
... task the Space Group with studying the
integration of these programmes into
WEU's activities and invite the intelligence
section of the Planning Cell. as soon as it is
set up. to give its opinion on problems
connected with the use of the system; ".
14. Furthennore. the first part of the WEU
Council's 41st annual report to the Assembly(l January 
- 
30 June 199-5) stated that the Space
Group, supported by its " Organising " and
" Technical " Working Groups. was continuing
the necessary studies in preparation for a proposal
for a decision on the possible implementation of a
WEU satellite programme and a draft memoran-
dum of understanding between member states.
15. The proposal for a decision was to be based
on one of three possible options, previously defi-
ned as follows:
- 
the establishment of a WEU satellite sys-
tem;
- 
participation in a multinational pro-
gramme under development;
- 
purchase of inrages.
16. Moreover. the Madrid Declaration resul-
ting from the meeting of the Council of Ministers
held in that city on l4 November 1995 endorsed a
decision tasking the Space Group to continue its
activities by defining the basic conditions for pos-
sible WEU participation in a " developing multi-
lateral European programme and to study ques-
tions related to a possible WEU ground segment.
taking account of existing ground segments
within WEU nations ".
17. A few weeks later. at the Franco-German
summit held in Baden-Baden on 7 December
2. " Towards a European space-based observatton system "
- 
report submrtted by Mr Vallerx.
1995, President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl laid
the basis for a cooperation agreement on two
space programmes: Helios 2, a French infrared
optical satellite, and Horus. a German radar satel-
lite.
18. What now needs to be done is to study the
experience the participating countries acquired in
the development, execution and operation of the
Helios 1 programme and the agreements they
concluded with WEU for supplying it with Helios
images. The second task is to decide what form
the Organisation's future participation in Helios 2
should take. The following sections of this report
concentrate on these issues.
II. Helios 1
19. On 2 February 1986, France took the deci-
sion to embark on the Helios programme. ln Sep-
tember that same year an agreement was signed
between the French Armed Forces General Staff,
the DGA (the Ddl6gation G6n6rale pour I'Arme-
ment or national armaments procurement office)
and CNES (Centre national d'6tudes spatiales. the
French space agency) regarding the joint develop-
ment of Helios and Spot 4. on the basis of an iden-
tical platform. The French Armed Forces General
StafT pilots the programmer. CNES has responsi-
bility for the programme's overall architecture
and is the contracting authority for the space com-
ponent. The ground component comes under the
direction of the DGA, which forms part of the
executive agency with the Ministry of Defence
and the Directorate of Missiles and Space'.
20. Since the capital investment required for
the Helios programrne entailed too heavy a finan-
cial commitment tor one country alone, France
decided to open the programme to other partners.
The result was the conclusion of a Helios coope-
ration agreement with Italy on 27 September 1987
and with Spain on 9 November 1988. This means
that the executive agency now comprises a tripar-
tite prograrnme management structure.
21. The funding shares taken by France, Italy
and Spain areJ8.9Va, 14.lVc andl% respectively,
making France the undisputed leader. Under the
agreement each cooperating country has the right
to have images taken prrt rata to financial partici-
pation, in accordance with the daily programming
rules for the satellite which are jointly prepared
and applied by the French, Spanish and Italian
General Staffs and intelligence services.
22. Also, the agreement makes provision for an
industrial return for each country. A group of
firms from each of the three countries is involved
3. See Appendix I.
4. See Appendix II for the Hehos I cotnponents
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in the programme under the prime contractorship
of Matra-Marconi Space. Cooperation between
the three countries is what makes Helios a symbol
as it is the first European space programme geared
to defence requirements.
23. On27 April 1993, the Ministers of Defence
of France and Spain, Mr FranEois L6otard and
Mr Julian Garcia Vargas, together with the Italian
Ambassador to Spain. Mr Antonio Ciarrapico,
and the Secretary-General of WEU. Mr Willem
van Eekelen, signed a Memorandum of Unders-
tanding (MOU) in Madrid on the supply of Helios
products to WEU by the three participating coun-
tries.
24. This MOU, signed the day before the offi-
cial inauguration of the WEU Satellite Centre,
authorises the WEU countries to receive Helios
images, ready for analysis as soon as possible.
including a range of collateral data.
25. There is every indication that the MOU
also stipulates that WEU can have access to the
special software required for image analysis on
conditions that are similar to those that apply to
France, Italy and Spain. On the basis of the infor-
mation your Rapporteur received, the Satellite
Centre must specify its objectives to the Helios
countries. They should then supply the correspon-
ding images for the Centre's exclusive use. As is
only to be expected, classifying the Helios images
is one of the problems of most concern to the three
Helios countries. which have reserved the right to
take the measures necessary to protect Helios pro-
ducts. Indeed, they are responsible for their classi-
fication and it is up to them to ensure that the
Satellite Centre respects the classification they
set. It would appear that the Torrej6n Centre can
obtain the necessary clearance for this purpose.
26. The Helios I programme consists of two
satellites called Helios 1A and 1B; the second of
these will be kept in storage and its launch date
will depend on the performance of Helios lA. The
development and production of this first satellite
started in 1989 and it was launched on an Ariane 4
launch vehicle on 7 July 1995 from the Kourou
launch site. Construction work on the second
satellite started in mid-1995 and is scheduled for
completion by the end of this year.
27. Each satellite, weighing 2.5 tonnes, has a
theoretical lifetime of some 4-5 years. It has a
limited capability of daytime observation in good
weather conditions and its resolution enables it to
identify most items of military equipment. The
satellite is in a sunsynchronous polar orbit at an
altitude of 677 kms and it has a repeat flyover time
of 24 hours, given its speed ofroughly 7.8 km per
second.
5. Air & Cosmos/Avratlon international, No
14 July 1995.
28. The satellite's orbit and manoeuvring capa-
cities guarantee that a given location can be observ-
ed every day and that 15 or so scenes can be taken
daily from orbits corresponding to priority inter-
est zones such as Europe, Africa and the Middle
East.
29. The satellite comprises a platform and a
payload. The platform houses a power supply, an
attitude and orbit control system and a satellite
control system using encrypted telecommand
links. The payload includes optical imaging ins-
trumentation, a data-gathering system using digi-
tal magnetic tape recorders and a telemetry sys-
tem for transmitting data to the ground stations.
The satellite carries a very high resolution infra-
metric camera.
30. The programme also includes a receiving
station and a data-processing centre in each of the
three countries. More will be said on this later.
31. The total cost of the programme could be
put at about ten billion francs, shared among the
countries party to the agreement on the basis of
the percentage rates already mentioned.
Stnergv befween civil and military activities
32. There is no doubt that missions carried out
by military satellites have important repercus-
sions in the civil sector, particularly when it
comes to monitoring natural disasters and protec-
ting civilian populationsl also, as stated by
Mr Fourr6, Chairman of Eucosat n, " in areas as
wide-ranging as maritime transport, agriculture or
poppy cultivation, space-based means can contri-
bute to controlling illegal activities ".
33. It is for this reason that " military and civi-
lian efforts must not compete with, but rather
complement one another and look for synergies "'.
These synergies should also be sought with a view
both to reducing the high cost of space pro-
grammes and to using technologies already pre-
sent in programmes that have been tried and test-
ed and are technologically and operationally
independent. To this end, civil and military tech-
nologies must accordingly be combined and exis-
ting technical and budget resources put to good
use by seeking to secure as many common ele-
ments as possible, thereby enhancing pro-
grammes under way.
34. Military programmes can therefore use to
their advantage the know-how acquired in equiva-
lent civil programmes and vice versa: there is no
doubt that the industrial repercussions of military
programmes boost momentum in space research
6. Colloquy on " A European space-based observation sys-
tem ", San Agustin, March 1995.
7. Mr Martinez-Garcra, Executive President of GMV(Spain). Colloquy on " A European space-based observation
system ". San Agustin, March 1995.
152',7 t28,
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and development work and in the space industry
in general.
35. The Helios programme's use of compo-
nents from the Spot civil satellite and of the
Ariane launcher clearly shows that synergy can be
achieved through cooperation between the civil
and military sectors.
36. With reference to Ariane, Arthur Paecht, a
member of the French National Assembly, has
said that " the existence of a civil launcher that
has proved its track record and cost-effectiveness
on commercial markets in the civil sector is the
only option and guarantee of the availability of a
launcher than can be used to meet military requi-
rements without restriction " 8. This aptly des-
cribes Ariane, which is used to launch civil and
military satellites alike.
31. The launchers in the Ariane series have
been developed by the European Space Agency
with the support of CNES and commercialised by
the Arianespace company. Among others, Euro-
pean space firms such as Daimler-Benz, Aerospa-
tiale and Matra-Marconi have participated in the
construction of Ariane.
38. On 7 July 1995, when an Ariane 4launcher
put the Helios 1A satellite into orbit, Mr Charles
Bigot, Chairman of Arianespace. expressed " the
company's great pride in launching a European
defence satellite for the first time ".
39. Spot is a commercial satellite for civilian
use produced by the Spot-Image company. Helios
uses a Spot 4 platform housing the payload,
power supply, a thermal control system and a
satellite control system using encrypted telecom-
mand links. Spot and Helios have separate atti-
tude and orbit control systems.
40. In addition, the two satellites are controlled
by the station-keeping centre and also have the
same magnetic tape recorders able to store several
hundred images. Both have a very similar general
architecture. Thus, Spot 4 and Helios I have 45Vo
of parts that are common to the satellite and the
station-keeping centre. This proportion of com-
mon parts has enabled the countries in the consor-
tium to make savings of 1.3 billion francs. This
approach will be repeated with Spot 5 and
Helios 2 and will lead to savings estimated at
about one billion francs.
The industrial issues
41. The cost of space-based systems, current
international competition and the advent of new
competitors, particularly in Asia. are some of the
problems confronting Europe's space industry
and even threatening its existence.
8. " Une nouvelle donne pour I'espace mrlitaire " by A.
Paecht, Revue de I'Assembl6e nationale, No. 1892
42. In a similar context. the Helios programme
represents a challenge not only from the strategic
but also the industrial viewpoint. Helios has given
fresh impetus to firms having to contend with a
decline in their turnover and a reduction in the
number of big space programmes.
43. Moreover. the programme has helped bring
about a series of changes in the European space
industry in the form of mergers or takeovers,
which improve the industrial and financial situa-
tion of the firms involved and enable them to put
up a better performance vis-i-vis foreign compe-
titors. One such example is the acquisition of Bri-
tish Aerospace Systems by Matra-Marconi Space
and others are mentioned in the section of this
report dealing with Helios 2.
44. Helios t has also provided a reason for the
continued existence of smaller, specialised firms
by increasing the demand for products from these
sub-sectors and offering them access to new tech-
nologies.
45. Thirty or so French, Italian and Spanish
firms have taken part in the development of the
Helios 1 programme and of what is called the
" ground segment ", that is, the ground-based
facilities.
46. Matra-Marconi Space (MMS) is the pro-
gramme's prime contractor both for the satellite
and the ground segment. As far as the satellite is
concerned, Aerospatiale was awarded the prime
contractorship for the imaging system with Ale-
nia, Casa, Reosc, Sextant, Sodern and others work-
ing with it in cooperation. Matra-Marconi Space
was also given the prime contractorship for the
vehicle equipment bay with the participation of
Alcatel, Alenia and Enertec, and for the platform
in association with Aerospatiale, Alcatel, Alenia,
Laben, Sagem, SEP, Sextant and Sodern.
47 . The following firms have worked in coope-
ration with MMS on the ground segment: Matra
Cap Systdmes, Matra D6fense, Alenia, Datamat,
Telespazio, Vitrociset, Crisa, Inisel and others.
48. MMS, the foremost European space
contractor with a turnover of 6 billion francs in
1994, is responsible for the integration of the
satellite, including its platform and payload, the
development of the platform, which is derived
from that of Spot 4, and the development of the
electrical ground systems.
49. With regard to its ground segment responsi-
bilities, MMS works with Matra Cap SystEmes on
the development of the operational software, inte-
gration of the Helios main centre software pro-
grams, and integration of the main centres and
image receiving centres with one anothere.
9. More details on the ground segment wrll be gtven further
on
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50. Aerospatiale. prime contractor for the ima-
ging system, also supervises the definition, deve-
lopment and operation of the reference image
simulation facilities for the programme together
with the definition of some of the procedures for
analysing quality control of images acquired in
flight.
51. Finally, according to Mr Didier l'Eleu de
la Simone r0' " the development of the Helios
satellites has necessitated the use of the most
advanced technologies in order to meet the requi-
site specifications. The space firms involved in
this programme have demonstrated their ability to
meet the technological challenge and have
enabled France, Italy and Spain to gain entry to
the very select club of countries with access to
information gathered in space ".
III. Helios 2
Lessons to be learntfrom the Helios I etperience
52. The novelty and success of the Helios I
programme are not due solely to the fact that three
European countries, France, Italy and Spain.
agreed to cooperate on the first European space
programme for defence purposes, or because
some thirty firms from those countries worked
together closely on the development of the two
satellites and the ground facilities. What really
differentiates Helios 1 from other programmes
carried out in cooperation and makes the venture
particularly distinctive is the fact that the partici-
pating countries also share the in-orbit operation
of the satellite.
53. Normally speaking, cooperation pro-
grammes are confined to sharing the development
and production of a given item of equipment, with
each participating country reserving the right to
use it subsequently for its own needs.
54. In the words of the Chief Armaments Engi-
neer, Mr Rabaultrr, Director of Missiles and Space
at the French national armaments procurement
office (DGA), the Helios programme " is an enti-
rely new departure for a security and defence sys-
tem and for our defence headquarters and services
that are the users of such systems ".
55. Speaking about Helios I at the Eucosat col-
loquy already mentioned. Colonel Molard said
there were five lessons to be learnt from the pro-
gramme: first. it showed it is possible to share an
observation system for defence purposes in the
particularly sensitive field of intelligence, on the
basis of a meticulous mutual learning process and
10. Military adviser at MMS. " Air Actualrt6s ". No. .180.
March 1995.
I l. Colloquy on " A European space-based observation sys-
tem ", San Agustrn, March 1995.
reciprocal trust. It is also possible to extend the
system of sharing to four countries but enlarging
it to take in five or more " would not make sense
because of the extremely low productivity that
would result "t however, Colonel Molard added
that " only an organisation such as WEU, pro-
gramming the system to be chosen, as a priority
on behalf of a European community, could
manage such a system ".
56. The second lesson concerns the excellent
cost-effectiveness obtained not only through
cooperation and synergy with Spot 4 but also
because space-based observation has been seen to
be a real way of multiplying assets.
57. The third point is that the composition of
the programme in terms of the participating coun-
tries is appropriate and its distinctiveness is based
on three factors: it is small, has an open-minded
approach to civilian know-how and is operational.
58. The fourth point concerns the principle of a
fair industrial return, and its application to each of
the programmes taken individually should. in
Colonel Molard's opinion, be studied to evaluate
its undoubted merits but also its limits.
59. Finally, a pragmatic approach is essential.
As Colonel Molard puts it: " it is preferable to
develop a first object, even a modest one, rather
than persist with a dream of an ambitious system
with a multitude of sensors. missions. and users
that cannot be realised in the short term ".
Wht, build a second Helios?
60. There are two main objectives behind the
decision to build Helios 2, a second optical obser-
vation satellite for military purposes, the first
being the need for a satellite to take over from the
first generation and the second being an improve-
ment in the programme from the technological
viewpoint.
61. Three principles were therefore taken into
account fiom the programme's outset: building on
experience and systems and adapting them as
appropriate, integrating new technologies and
improving the programme through the incorpora-
tion of infrared components that will make obser-
vation by night possible and will consequently
enable more information to be gathered.
62. As a result of experience gained from
Helios I and the lessons learnt from the pro-
gramme, the development and operation of
Helios 2 should make it possible to cut the time
required for collecting images by a half or a third.
obtain an increased detection capability (simulta-
neous scenes and a higher resolution), and accom-
modate the idea of synergy between the civil and
military sectors (Spot 5 and Helios 2), this being
an area with scope for savings of the order of a
billion francs.
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Agreemenls befit'een France and Germany 
- 
pur-
ticipetiort of ltall,and Spain
63. The Franco-German Security Council.
consisting of the President of the French Republic
and the German Chancellor together with the
foreign and defence ministers and the chiefs of
staff of both countries, was set up in 1982. A com-
mittee comprising the French and German foreign
policy directors and chiefs of staff produces a six-
monthly report establishing the issues that are
submitted to the Council for examination and
decision.
64. In addition, three working groups were
created on strategy and disarmament. military
cooperation and armaments cooperation, as well
as a series of standing and ad hoc sub-groups.
65. A large proportion of the work done at the
most recent Franco-German summit, held in
Baden-Baden on 7 December 1995, was devoted
to security and defence problems. It was showed
that cooperation between the armed forces of the
two countries is proceeding most satisfactorily. as
is cooperation on armaments. France and Ger-
many decided to set up their own armaments
structure taking account of the fact that at their
meeting in October 1995, the WEAG National
Armaments Directors did not in fact take the plan-
ned decision to create the European Armaments
Agency and did not give their views on the set-
ting-up of a Franco-German armaments agency.
66. The most widely expected. and equally the
most important, decision taken at the summit was
no doubt the decision on Franco-German coope-
ration on observation satellites. The ad hoc inter-
ministerial group on observation satellites had in
fact submitted its findings on this subject in June
1995 and Germany had still not taken a final deci-
sion, mainly because of the need to find the neces-
sary funding'2 but also because of pressure from
the United States which was offering Germany
access on very favourable conditions to informa-
tion gathered in space by a Lockheed Martin
satellite.
61. In the end, Germany made the right choice
and went for the European solution by responding
positively to the proposal tiom France, which had
done its utmost to persuade Germany to join the
programme for political. military, economic and
industrial reasons.
68. The Franco-German agreement covers
cooperation on the Helios 2 programme and the
German Horus radar satellite project given that
they are complementary. The practical details of
the agreement are still being negotiated at the time
of writing and your Rapporteur will come back to
them further on.
69. In the view of the French Defence Minister.
Mr Millon, the agreement's significance is three-
fold: " political, because it fits in with the vision
of European construction that France and Ger-
many share " ... " military, because it anticipates
closer operational cooperation in a strategic area "
and finally " industrial. because it opens the door
to the formation of a European group able to com-
pete worldwide ".
10. The first consequence of the agreement was
the signature on 15 December 1995 of the proto-
cols for the creation by Aerospatiale and Dasa of
two joint subsidiaries, European Satellite Indus-
tries (ESI) and European Missile Systems (EMS).
11. The ESI holding company (in which Aero-
spatiale and Dasa each have a 50Vo share) will be
located in Munich and managed by a German
national. It will have two subsidiaries: ESI Deutsch-
land, based in Friedrichshafen. and ESI France,
based in Cannes. This will make ESI the leading
European satellite company and as such it will
participate in the Helios 2 programme and the
Horus project.
72. Even though Helios 2 is no more than the
logical follow-on to Helios 1, there will be some
industrial changes due to Germany joining the
programme. Matra-Marconi Space will remain
the prime contractor for the programme while
Daimler Benz Aerospace wi1l be prime contractor
for the Horus radar observation satellite, mainly
because of the expertise it has acquired with the
European Space Agency's ERS-1 and ERS-2
remote-sensing satellites.
73. The Helios 2 and Horus programmes
immediately had major repercussions in that they
brought about Franco-German rapprochement in
the space field, a decisive move for the future of
European military space activities. and also creat-
ed the conditions for setting up two ESI subsidia-
ries which. in the words of the Chief Executive of
Aerospatiale. Mr Louis Gallois, " constitute a
major step forward for structuring the European
space and defence industry and will provide
Europe with the means it needs to improve its
competitiveness on fiercely competitive world
markets "'r.
74. Italy and Spain had made their participation
in the Helios 2 programme contingent upon Ger-
many's response. Once Germany had decided tojoin the programme. a first meeting of the four
countries was held in Rome on l7 January 1996.
Its results and the ensuing negotiations, which are
still going on, give grounds for thinking that the
four countries' contributions to the Helios 2 and
Horus programmes could be as follows:
- 
Germany would contribute 20Vo of
Helios 2 funding and l07o of the work
12. Air & Cosmos, 15 December 1995. 13. Arr & Cosmos. No. 15.1-5--16. 22 December 1995.
DOCUMENT 1525
given that the programme is already at an
advanced stage'*. Germany's contribu-
tion to Horus funding could be as high as
60Vo;
- 
France would contribute 60Va of Helios 2
funding and between l5%o and 20Vo of
Horus funding;
- 
Italy's funding share would be 7Vo for
Helios and20Vo for Horus. While Italy's
commitment is almost firm, this does not
seem to be the case for Spain, which
maintains its declaration of intent pen-
ding a final decision by the new govern-
ment. Spain envisages a 37o contrlbution
to each of the programmes.
75. It does not seem that any other country has
been contacted to take part in the Helios 2 or the
Horus programme. In reply to a parliamentary
question from Lord Kennet as to whether the Uni-
ted Kingdom had expressed a desire to participate
in Helios 2 and whether its commitments to the
United States ruled out any such participation. the
British Government said it had not made such an
approach but that in any event its commitments to
the United States would not preclude that possibi-
lity and that the United Kingdom could take part
in the programme through WEU. According to
certain unofficial calculations, the participation of
a fifth partner could put the programme's cost up
by about l2vo mainly owing to industrial returns.
IV The ground facilities
76. The Helios 1 programme consists of a
space segment 
- 
the Helios space component 
-
which comprises the satellite and the station-keep-
ing centre, and a ground segment 
- 
the user
ground component 
- 
which consists of a Helios
main centre and an image receiving centre in each
of the three participating countries ''.
17. The main duties of the station-keeping
centre are to operate and monitor the satellite on a
daily basis. For this purpose the centre is equip-
ped with two control rooms:
- 
the satellite control centre, which pro-
vides an on-line link with the satellite and
carries out programmed operations when
the satellite flies over the telecommand
stations located at Aussaguel, near Tou-
louse, in Kourou (French Guiana), on the
Kerguelen Islands and at Hartebeesthoek
(South Africa);
14. It should be remembered that the definition phase of the
programme staned in April 1994 and that a year later, April
1995 saw the start of the development and production phase
for the first satellite rn the programme, Helios 2,{, whrch is
due to be completed by 2001 .
I 5. See Appendix II.
- 
the utilities management centre, which
manages the satellites and their payloads
offline; it prepares the operations, in par-
ticular the satellite programming mes-
sages that are drawn up on the basis of the
work schedules received from the user
ground component.
In essence, the station-keeping centre's role is to
" listen, control, monitor, intervene and
manoeuvre "ru.
Tlrc ground segment for the Helios programme
78. The user ground component primarily
consists of the French Helios main centre, which
is the nub of the system. It is located at Creil and
centralises image requests from the authorities in
France, Italy and Spain so as to relay them to the
station-keeping centre for the purpose of drawing
up the satellite's daily work schedule.
79. The French Helios main centre has a staff
of 200 officers and NCOs taken from France's
three services who are responsible for operations,
programming and analysis. It also has a contin-
gent of 10 Italian and Spanish officers and NCOs
who are responsible for the international task-
sharing aspect.
80. Each day, the three Helios main centres 
- 
at
Creil (France), Pratica di Mare (Italy) and Torre-j6n (Spain) 
- 
prepare the daily satellite pro-
gramme on the basis of national priorities and
send the programming data to the French Helios
main centre where the tripartite work schedule is
drawn up. Each country therefore chooses its
objectives, states its requirements and lists
its priorities on the basis of urgency and impor-
tance. Creil is the forum for the " daily tripartite
dialogue with a view to optimising the work sche-
dule " ''.
81. Once it has been decided, the programming
schedule for the following day, which takes
account of each country's priorities and of satel-
lite utilisation time, is sent in coded form to the
station-keeping centre. which uploads it to the
satellite. The satellite then takes the relevant
images and delivers them in real time or in
slightly deferred time when it flies within the
visible range of the image receiving centres at
Colmar. Lecce and Maspalomas. Thus each of the
three countries receives its images in the form of
telemetry data on its own national antenna for
onward transmission to its main centre where they
are analysed.
82. This then is how the system actually ope-
rates and it has demonstrated its feasibility in the
complex field of information-sharing.
16. Air Actualit6s. No. 480. March 1995.
17. Colonel Molard, Armed Forces General Staff. Space
Office. Eucosat colloquy, Bonn, 20-21 September 199-5.
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Tlrc WEU Satellite Centre
83. The WEU Council of Ministers, meeting in
Vianden in June 1991, decided to create a satellite
image interpretation centre whose task, in the first
instance, was to consist in training European
experts to interpret photographic images taken by
satellites. It was also to include the job of proces-
sing the data and making it available to the mem-
ber states. in particular for the verification of
disarmament treaties, crisis monitoring and envi-
ronmental monitoring.
84. A few months later, in November 1991, the
Council of Ministers agreed to locate the centre at
the Torrej6n air base in Spain. The Centre was
officially inaugurated on 28 April 1993 and the
event was considered by all the participants to be
a historic occasion given that it was WEU's first
tangible achievement in the building of a Euro-
pean security and defence architecture.
85. After a provisional three-year phase during
which the Centre was directed by a British natio-
nal, Mr Barry Blaydes, whose efforts and devo-
tion deserve recognition, the WEU Council of
Ministers, meeting in Madrid in November 1995,
altered the Centre's status making it a permanent
subsidiary body of WEU under Article VIII.2 of
the modified Brussels Treaty. Since the beginning
of 1996, the Centre has been directed by Colonel
Bernard Molard of the French Air Force, who
until then had been in charge of the Helios pro-
grarnme.
86. The Centre has a Steering Committee
consisting of a representative from each of the
member and associate member countries. The
Committee's role is currently carried out by the
WEU Space Group, which reports to the Council.
The Space Group is itself subdivided into two
working groups, the " Organising " Working
Group, responsible for management and general
organisation, and the " Technical " Working
Group whose task consists in drawing up system
specifications and selecting options with a view to
the feasibility study management team's final
report on the development of a European space-
based observation system.
87. These groups meet frequently and at regu-
lar intervals and their work is extremely useful in
that they seek consensus at the lowest level. In
fact, in accordance with the decision taken in
Madrid in November 1995, they endeavour to
define the basic conditions for possible WEU par-
ticipation in the Helios programme, including its
ground segment. Their work includes a study of
what is called the second option (participation in
Helios) and is also intended to pave the way for
WEU to be prepared for a possible proposal from
the Helios countries.
88. The Satellite Centre and its operations have
already been described in Document 1437, the
report by Mr L6pez Henares on " The future of
the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n ". For this
reason. your Rapporteur has confined himself to
providing only the new information available
about the Centre.
89. The sources used by the Centre are com-
mercial satellites 
- 
Spot (France), ERS-1 (Euro-
pean Space Agency), Landsat (United States),
Radarsat (Canada) 
- 
images from Russia and air-
borne images supplied by official sources in the
member states.
90. Besides these images, which 
- 
as has
already been said 
- 
are available on a commercial
basis, the Memorandum of Understanding signed
on 27 April 1993 makes provision for the Centre
to receive images taken by the Helios satellite.
Indeed, the first such images arrived at the Centre
on 3 May 1996 and interpretation work on them is
already being done on the basis of the Sarajevo
task requested by the Planning Cell.
91. According to information supplied by the
Centre, it had canied out the following tasks as at
I May 1996:
TreaQ verification
' support for CFE and OSCE
inspection visits 8
. support for Open Skies missions 2
. infrastructure change 3
. non-proliferation treaties 0
Total 13
Crisis monitoring
. preparation for humanitarian aid 12
. support in preventing non-
compliance with sanctions 1
. detection of military movements 13
Total 26
Ertvi ronme ntal mon ito rirt g
. natural risks 1
. monitoring of nature of terrain 4
monitoring of illicit movements 1
Total 6
92. In accordance with the decision of the
WEU Council, the Organisation is the Centre's
prime user and its member and associate members
are also entitled to use it. The Centre's annual
budget, which comes to 1l million ecus for the
current year, covers staff remuneration and the
purchase of images. When establishing priorities
among countries' requests, the User Committee
takes account of their financial contributions to
the Centre.
93. When member and associate member
countries request a specific task from the Centre,
they are not required to provide additional funds.
Once the Centre receives a task request, it draws
up an analysis report on the basis of which the
11
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Centre and user agree on the details of the task
and in particular on the collateral data to be sup-
plied. Once agreement has been reached, the
WEU Council is informed of the task request.
94. In the following stage, and according to
information from the Centre itself, it proceeds to
purchase the relevant images and interpret them.
Copies of the dossiers thus acquired are sent to all
member and associate member countries.
95. Staff recruitment. which has given rise to
some difficulties because of the obligation to
maintain a certain geographical balance between
the various posts, has now ended, which means
the Centre will be fully operational by the middle
of the current year. particularly as regards Helios.
There is every indication that the problems posed
by Helios-specific software and the need for the
Centre to obtain clearance in order to handle any
classified information it receives in the form
of encrypted data have now been satisfactorily
resolved.
V Some thoughts and conclusions
96. Experience acquired with Helios I has
shown that it is possible to share a military space-
based observation system, that by applying
synergy with Spot the cost-effectiveness ratio is
wholly satisfactory, and that the organisation
required for the system's development and exploi-
tation is small, flexible and operational. On the
matter of synergy between the civil and military
sectors, your Rapporteur would stress an idea
already put forward in the Committee's earlier
reports, namely. that of establishing official and
regular contacts with the European Space Agency
with a view to having recourse to the Agency's
experience and structures in so far as they could
serve WEU's objectives ''.
97. WEU's participation in the Helios 2 pro-
gramme is therefore not only desirable and neces-
sary 
- 
it must also be feasible. First, it should be
said that the deadlines set in the Helios 2 time-
table must be met at all costs. To this end. our
Organisation needs to act swiftly and resolutely
and should demonstrate its lirm political resolve
to participate in the programme. keeping to the
deadlines.
98. WEU should not expect to receive an offer
from the Helios 2 participating countries but
should express its desire to take part in the pro-
gramme. Its involvement could not be industrial.
mainly because the imperative need to keep to the
fixed deadlines would make this impossible and
also because the resulting increase in the pro-
18. Mr Luton. Drrector General of ESA. expressed a rvrlltn-
gness for collaboratron rn hrs address to the Eucosat colloquy
held in Bonn rn September 199-5
gramme's costs would far outweigh any benefits
accruing from the financial contribution of a fifth
partner. It would be advisable for WEU to put for-
ward a proposal based on its operational requrre-
ments. It goes without saying that such a proposal
must include both the Helios 2 and Horus pro-
grammes.
99. The purpose of a financial contribution
from WEU would therefore be to secure direct
involvement in the satellite's programming.
100. The Helios 2 participating countries should
be fully prepared to accept WEU's participation
and discount any other option they may have
envisaged. such as that of WEU purely and sim-
ply improving the operational capabilities of the
Satellite Centre or purchasing and operating its
own satellite.
l0l. There is no doubt that the current arrange-
ment agreed between the Helios participating
countries and WEU is a good start but it will be
totally inadequate to meet the Organisation's
needs in the future; thus, the best way for WEU to
improve the situation would be for it to participate
in the satellite's programming on an equal footing
with the other partners.
102. Under no circumstances should WEU's
proposal be confined to an aggregate of various
national requirements. Instead, it should be the
amalgamation of a shared strategic vision. It will
have to be compatible with the requirements of
the Helios 2 countries and complement them,
which is perfectly feasible.
103. WEU should take the necessary steps to
secure the Planning Cell and Intelligence Sec-
tion's eft-ective and permanent involvement in
space matters. This concerns not only the prepara-
tion of an offer to the Helios 2 partner countries
but also includes the system's programming and
operating aspects as a whole. It would also be
appropriate to take similar action in respect of the
Satellite Centre. a point the Assembly has stressed
on several occasions without having received a
precise and convincing response from the Coun-
cil.
104. It is not really possible for the time being to
provide any further details on this subject, mainly
because the current Helios 2 partners have sup-
plied only scant information. This is probably due
to the fact that they are still engaged in negotia-
tions.
105. The radar satellite programne is linked to
Helios 2 because. as has already been said. the
two programmes are complementary. Negotia-
tions between WEU and the partner countries
should therefore embrace both programmes. As
the Horus programme is at a less advanced stage,
it would still be possrble to envisage industrial
participation by the WEU countries.
t2
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106. As lar as the Satellite Centre is concerned,
once solutions have been found to the problems
relating to the software needed for Helios 1. the
classification of Helios products, the protection
thereof and of auxiliary infbrmation, the next step
must be to make the procedure followed so far
more flexible in order to simplify procedures and
thereby reduce the time they take to complete.
107. In addition. it should be stressed that the
images continue to reach the Centre by post and
that WEU's involvement in the Helios I and 2
programmes will require the Centre to have its
own receiving antenna and a telecommunications
link with Brussels.
108. Furthermore, the Centre should be equip-
ped with a mobile satellite receiving station along
the lines of the Eagle Vision concept presented by
Mr Cothier, Director General of Matra Cap Sys-
tbmes, in his address to the colloquy the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee organised in
San Agustin in March 1995. Eagle Vision consists
of a transportable imaging station that can be used
for on-the-spot image acquisition and analysis
anywhere in the world. The system mainly uses
existing software, designed for the Spot pro-
gramme with CNES. The number of items that
required specific development is minimal and the
system architecture uses standard hardware.
109. The programme was tunded by the Penta-
gon through the foreign comparative tests chan-
nel. It was developed and delivered to the United
States Air Force in 1994 by Matra Cap Systdmes.
The system offers exceptional possibilities for
supplying images necessary to a commander in
the theatre. Such a mobile station. which can be
made available very quickly, would be the direct
responsibility of the Planning Cell and would be
of considerable use (for instance. in monitoring
the Dayton Accords).
110. Finally, for the purpose of monitoring the
surface of the globe, your Rapporteur wishes to
underline the importance of combining airborne
and satellite options. The airborne option would
make it possible to study other sources of irnages.
data and all such information, thus complemen-
ting the satellite option. This view was expressed
on several occasions by the former Director of the
Satellite Centre. Mr Blaydes.
111. A satellite is not in fact a platform that is
suitable for permanent observation and it could be
said that its value lies in the strategic field and in
its use for the cleation of documentary databases.
ll2. If the main requirements are permanent
observation, the creation of very high imaging
resolution in order to identify medium-sized
objects, and observation of the same zone using a
number of different sensors, an airborne platform
flying at high altitude is the most appropriate
vehicle. For a platform flying at 15 km altitude.
the radioelectric horizon is at a distance of400 km
and the zone that is observable without too tnany
masks can extend to up 200 km. providing perma-
nent observation ofthe order of 20 hours. The on-
board sensors can serve a wide range of purposes
such as radar imaging providing a resolution of a
few metres. mobile echo radar sensing and track-
ing, detecting and pinpointing radioelectric
transmitters. listening to communications on a
Herzian wave medium and. possibly, taking
images with a long-range oblique viewing
camera. In addition to the sensors, the platform
can accommodate systems providing permanent
cornmunications at a very high flow rate.
I I 3. Some of the solutions developed to date are
described below:
- 
The United States JSTARS system is
based on a vertical integration of the
detection, analysis and monitoring func-
tions on board a single airborne platfbrm.
It is the result of the need to be able to
project an autonomous system for the
surveillance and conduct of operations
over a long distance in the hypothesis that
long-distance high flow-rate communica-
tions are not possible. However, it should
be noted that this " autonomous " system
must be combined with an AWACS and
its escorts.
- 
The sound basis underlying the United
Kingdom's ASTOR system is that. as a
priority, an airborne platform must
accommodate sensors so that their perfor-
mance is not hindered by the horizon and
that analysis and monitoring systems are
more effrcient if they are in the right posi-
tion at the right time. However, the plat-
form's small size does not allow for
simultaneous use of the various comple-
mentary sensors which would be useful.
- 
While the French MOSTA-type solution
does not exclude the possibility ofprojec-
ting a genuinely autonomous system for
the surveillance and conduct of opera-
tions, it is above all a platform that can
very effectively accommodate various
monitoring sensors whose complementa-
rity means that precise information about
the tactical situation in the zone under
observation can be obtained on line; in its
basic configuration, the analysis station is
therefore located on the surface (on the
ground or on a ship).
ll4. This type of airborne system constitutes the
tactical Earth observation system which Europe
needs. It could for example be used to monitor
implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and support the European
implementation force.
13
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I 15. In view of the importance of the issues invol-
ved, your Rapponeur believes it would be appro-
priate for the Committee to produce a report in the
near future on monitoring the Earth using airborne
means. Such a report would study requirements and
existing solutions and would make the appropriate
recommendations to the WEU Council.
116. Finally, in the Birmingham Declaration
issued by the WEU Council of Ministers at its
meeting on 7 May 1996, the ministers welcomed
the continuing progress in developing the Satellite
Centre's effectiveness and the beginning of the
supply of Helios imagery to the Centre; they
noted " with interest " the decision taken by
France and Germany jointly to develop an earth
observation satellite system. The ministers also
noted that work is continuing on defining the
conditions for " possible WEU participation in a
developing multilateral European programme "
and looked forward to a " progress report ". In the
absence of genuine political will regarding this
most fundamental aspect of European security
and defence, it would appear that the Council of
Ministers was not prepared to take a decisive and
responsible initiative on the issue.
t4
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
- 
PILOT GENERAL STAFF FOR THE PROGRAMME:
French Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces General Staff.
_ EXECUTIVE AGENCY
French Ministr-v of Defence, national armaments procurement ffice(DGA), Directorate of missiles and space, Tripartite programme manuge-
ment structure (France, Spain, ItaU).
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